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ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE?—WHY 
CITIZENS’ VOTES CARRY UNEQUAL 
WEIGHT DESPITE BAKER AND HOW IT 
MATTERS* 
John D. Griffin† 
Brian Newman†† 
THE COURT’S VOTING POWER PRINCIPLE 
Baker v. Carr stands for the (at times contested) principle that the 
federal courts may intervene to assess whether citizens’ votes carry 
equal weight in state voting procedures.1 According to the Baker 
Court, before Baker—and the revolution that it spawned—citizens’ 
votes did not have equal influence on the lawmaking process, 
contrary to what the Constitution requires because differently–sized 
populations could be represented by the same number of elected 
officials. 
We contend that even after Baker and its associated cases, voters 
remain unequal. At least from the perspective of a member of 
Congress seeking reelection, some citizens (i.e., likely voters and 
“swing” voters) are more important than others. Consequently, 
members of Congress tend to act in closer concert with the 
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1
 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). For an example of contestation of the Baker 
principle, see Nelson Lund, From Baker v. Carr to Bush v. Gore, and Back, 62 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 947 (2012). The principle was extended to federal elections in Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 
U.S. 1 (1964). 
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preferences of constituents whose votes matter more. Since some 
groups (e.g., the young, racial/ethnic minorities) are less likely to vote 
or be swing voters, these groups tend to receive less of what they 
want from government compared to other groups. 
The Court’s approach in Baker presumes the relative homogeneity 
of citizens’ policy preferences within electoral districts and conceives 
of the legislature as primarily a distributive body where all citizens 
desire a larger share of the federal pie. In this case, if differently sized 
(and disagreeing) districts are both represented by a single legislator, 
the citizens of the more populous district will have their votes diluted. 
In order for citizens to have equal influence over legislative 
outcomes, district populations must be equal. As the Court later 
articulated in Reynolds v. Sims—“the right of suffrage can be denied 
by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as 
effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the 
franchise.”2  
Gray v. Sanders3 then signaled that within a single electoral district 
(in Gray, a state), electoral rules that aggregate votes in such a 
manner that votes are not counted equally are also unconstitutional. 
At issue in Gray was whether the Democratic Party primary for the 
nomination of U.S. Senate and other statewide officers could employ 
a “county–unit” system wherein unit votes were allocated to counties 
by population, but the relationship between population and units in 
the allocation formula was logarithmic rather than linear. In striking 
down this election procedure, the Court extended Baker to require 
equally populated geographical units within electoral districts. That 
is, citizens should have equal say in the selection of their elected 
representatives.  
Here, the Court contemplates that citizens in a district who belong 
to politically relevant demographic groups will not always agree with 
one another about the best policy direction and, in this case, all 
individuals should have equal say in the selection of their elected 
representative: “Once the geographical unit for which a representative 
is to be chosen is designated, all who participate in the election are to 
have an equal vote—whatever their race, whatever their sex, whatever 
their occupation, whatever their income, and wherever their home 
may be in that geographical unit.”4 To aggregate individual votes in 
such a way that a minority could defeat a majority, as was true in 
Georgia before Gray, meant that citizens’ votes carried unequal 
                                                                                                                 
2
 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).  
3
 372 U.S. 368 (1963). 
4
 Id. at 379.  
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weight. This, of course, the Court could not abide: “Once the class of 
voters is chosen and their qualifications specified, we see no 
constitutional way by which equality of voting power may be 
evaded.”5 Finally, invoking the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th 
Amendment, the Gray Court concluded: “The conception of political 
equality . . . can mean only one thing—one person, one vote.”6  
This Article contends that, in these cases, the Court was concerned 
about whether citizens have equal say in the selection of officials not 
only because it may affect who wins an election. Additionally, and 
perhaps even more importantly, the Court was concerned about this 
issue because regardless of who wins any given race we have reason 
to expect that in any system where votes are unequally weighted, 
elected officials will serve the interests of those whose votes matter 
most. Stated another way, one important motivation behind the one 
person, one vote principle is to move our system of government 
toward equal representation. 
Behind Baker is an empirical assumption that when citizens hold 
unequal voting weight, their elected representatives will be more 
attentive to those holding more electoral weight. A half–century later, 
we test this assumption. Below, we ask first whether citizens really 
have equal voting power. Finding that they do not, we examine 
whether Baker’s assumption is correct, asking whether citizens with 
more voting power are better represented. We argue that despite 
Baker and Gray, voting power is not equal across the population. 
Some votes affect the outcome of an election more than others. 
Moreover, citizens’ preferences are not reflected in the actions of 
their representatives in equal measure. Those with more voting power 
tend to enjoy greater correspondence between their policy preferences 
and their representatives’ actions than is true for those with less 
voting power. We argue that the Baker court assumed correctly that 
unequal votes would lead to unequal representation of constituents’ 
policy preferences in their representatives’ behavior in office. 
Although the Baker decision and those following it may have moved 
the country closer to one of equal voting power, significant inequality 
in voting power remains. 
THE MEANING AND IMPORTANCE OF VOTING POWER 
Members of Congress (MCs) have electoral incentives to treat 
constituents unequally. To see this, think of an MC who has the 
                                                                                                                 
5
 Id. at 381. As we make clear below, the Court’s notion of “voting power” in this line of 
cases is related to, but also distinct from, the conception of voting power we analyze below. 
6
 Id. 
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capacity to choose a small number of her total constituents who 
would become slightly more favorable toward her. Who would she 
choose? Presumably, she would choose those constituents who are 
likely to vote. Improving a small group of citizens’ favorability 
toward the MC would not help her re-election effort if the target 
constituents do not typically vote. Only those who vote can weigh in 
on the re-election or rejection of the incumbent.7 In addition, the MC 
would presumably choose constituents who sit on the fence between 
voting for or against her. A small bit of newfound favorability toward 
the MC will not affect the votes of constituents who long ago 
determined to vote for or against her. Thus, MCs, who have to 
allocate scarce resources like their advertising dollars, time, and roll-
call votes, have incentives to allocate those resources to affect the 
votes of likely voters who are not yet committed to voting for or 
against the MC. This is not to dismiss an MC’s need to attend to his 
or her “base” supporters; however, “swing” or “marginal” voters will 
receive disproportionate attention from a calculating politician.8 As 
Larry Bartels put it, “[r]ational candidates seeking to maximize their 
electoral prospects must ‘go hunting where the ducks are,’ tailoring 
their appeals to those prospective voters who are both likely to turn 
out and susceptible to conversion.”9 
The concept of voting power reflects the contribution an individual 
will make to an incumbent’s re-election effort. MCs can easily assess 
any given citizen’s voting power from fairly basic and relatively 
easily ascertained political characteristics. The relevant political 
characteristics include demographic or attitudinal qualities a citizen 
possesses that provide a cue to elected officials about the citizen’s 
likely political behavior. For instance, in the United States we might 
say that a citizen’s race/ethnicity, income, gender, and age—as well 
as whether the individual is a partisan or an independent—are likely 
to convey information to an elected official about two aspects of the 
citizen’s likely political behavior.  
First, these qualities may convey information about the likelihood 
that the individual will participate in the next election. For instance, if 
an individual is a twenty-five year old Latino male, based on his age 
or ethnicity or gender (or a combination of the three) and the turnout 
                                                                                                                 
7
 See Larry M. Bartels, Where the Ducks Are: Voting Power in a Party System, in 
POLITICIANS AND PARTY POLITICS 43, 45 (John G. Geer ed., 1998) (“[P]oliticians must care 
more . . . about the views of regular voters than about the views of people who seldom or never 
get to the polls.”).  
8
 See STANLEY KELLEY, JR., INTERPRETING ELECTIONS 87–95 (1983) (discussing the 
impact of marginal voters on the 1964 presidential election).  
9
 Bartels, supra note 7, at 43. 
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propensity of these groups, the official can estimate the likelihood 
that the individual will participate in the next election. Individuals 
with high turnout propensities are more likely to influence an MC’s 
re-election prospects because they are very likely to vote for either the 
incumbent or the challenger. These individuals, therefore, have more 
voting power than those unlikely to vote. 
Second, these qualities provide cues about an individual’s 
tendency to favor one of the parties. So, using the individual in the 
preceding paragraph once again as an example, the elected official 
will want to assess the tendency of the young, Latinos, and males to 
favor one of the parties. Individuals whose qualities suggest that they 
do not have a tendency to favor one of the parties possess more voting 
power. Citizens whose votes are up for grabs are especially attractive 
because their votes are both not already secured and not unattainable. 
Thought of another way, these votes can be won, but if they are not, 
they are very likely to go to one’s opponent.  
Voting power merits our attention because inequalities in voting 
power are likely to be translated into inequalities in political 
influence. To see this, we build a theoretical argument from a series 
of assumptions to two hypotheses: 
ASSUMPTION 1: AN INSTITUTIONAL CONFIGURATION WITH SINGLE-
MEMBER DISTRICTS  
Article I, section 2 of the Constitution provides that, “The House 
of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every 
second year by the People of the several States . . . Representatives 
. . . shall be apportioned among the several States which may be 
included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers.”10 
The Constitution did not, however, specify the manner in which 
representatives are to be apportioned or the means of electing 
representatives. The Framers did appear to contemplate the possibility 
of single– member districts. James Madison wrote in Federalist Paper 
Number 56, “divide the largest State into ten or twelve districts and it 
will be found that there will be no peculiar interests . . . which will 
not be within the knowledge of the Representative of the district.”11 
Nevertheless, most of the original thirteen states used multi-member 
districts in the first congressional elections.12  
                                                                                                                 
10
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
11
 THE FEDERALIST NO. 56, at 340 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., Penguin Books 
1987).  
12
 MICHAEL J. DUBIN, UNITED STATES CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS, 1788–1997: THE 
OFFICIAL RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS OF THE 1ST THROUGH 105TH CONGRESSES (Mcfarland 
and Co. ed., 1998). 
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Over the next half-century, single-member districts were adopted 
with increasing frequency such that by 1842 only six states were 
electing representatives at-large and twenty-two states were electing 
representatives in single-member districts (three states had only one 
representative).13 This arrangement changed with the Apportionment 
Act of 1842, which contained a requirement of single-member 
districts: representatives “shall be elected by districts composed of 
contiguous territory equal in number to the number of representatives 
to which said state may be entitled, no one district electing more than 
one representative.”14  
This prescription was not always followed nor enforced until 1967 
when Congress prohibited at-large and other multi-member elections 
by states with more than one House seat.15  
The use of single member districts matters for the allocation of 
voting power across citizens not only because, as the Baker court 
recognized, it argues for equally-populated districts, but also because 
the single-member district electoral system affects the number of 
political parties that vie for office. As Maurice Duverger would have 
predicted, the widespread adoption of single-member district 
elections has largely restricted the American political system to just 
two political parties,16 or two “effective” parties.17 In a two-party 
system where some voters are unwilling to make a “standing 
decision”18 to vote for the candidates of one of the parties they will, 
all else equal, possess more voting power. That is, the vote choices of 
these “swing voters” will largely determine which candidate is 
victorious. Conversely, as the number of parties proliferates and more 
voters easily identify a party with which they are comfortable making 
a standing decision, the voting power of citizens becomes more equal. 
                                                                                                                 
13
 Id. 
14
 Reapportionment Act of 1842, ch. 323, 5 Stat. 491. 
15
 Law of Dec. 14, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90–196, 81 Stat. 581. Only two states, Hawaii and 
New Mexico, were affected by this legislation: all other states were using elections by district. 
Meanwhile in the United States Senate the staggered election of each state’s two Senators has 
effectively resulted in single member district Senate elections. Each state’s Senate seats, most 
crucially, are filled in a separate election, even on the rare occasion when they are held 
simultaneously. 
16
 See MAURICE DUVERGER, POLITICAL PARTIES 217 (Barbara North & Robert North 
trans., John Wiley & Sons ed. 1954) (1951) (“[T]he simple-majority single-ballot system 
favours the two-party system.”) (emphasis in the original). 
17
 See, e.g., Rein Taagepera & Matthew Soberg Shugart, Predicting the Number of 
Parties: A Quantitative Model of Duverger's Mechanical Effect, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 455, 
455 (1993) (presenting a model for estimating electoral systems based on the “effective” 
number of parties).     
18
 V. O. Key, Jr. & Frank Munger, Social Determinism and Electoral Decision: the Case 
of Indiana, in AMERICAN VOTING BEHAVIOR 281, 286 (Eugene Burdick & Arthur J. Brodbeck 
ed., 1959). 
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That is, if all voters are predictable supporters of one of the parties 
then virtually no voters are swing voters and voting power reduces to 
a function of anticipated turnout. Conversely, party proliferation may 
make it easier for voters to imagine voting for another party because 
it may decrease the average dissimilarity of at least some party 
platforms. In this case, most voters may be swing voters that again 
tend to equalize voting power across citizen subgroups.  
In contrast, in a two-party system, a group whose members are 
highly unlikely to vote for one of the parties may well be all but 
ignored. Candidates’ scarce resources will be focused instead on 
swing voters rather than those who have made the “standing decision” 
to support one particular party. Individuals who are largely 
unpersuadable or unconvertible will have lower voting power than 
swing voters. This electoral system can lead to some groups being 
“captured” by one party since the group generally cannot be expected 
to vote for the other party.19 
ASSUMPTION 2: MCS DESIRE RE-ELECTION 
There was a time when this assumption might not have been 
broadly supportable. In the early Congresses, there was heavy 
turnover.20 Today, we can safely assume that MCs desire re-election. 
In 2010, just 7.5 percent (33 of 435) House Members retired—the 
remainder stood for re-election. Of the thirty-three retirees, most 
stood for election to other offices such as Governor or Senator of their 
state, requiring that they relinquish their House seat. This number also 
includes those who retired from any form of employment. Finally, of 
those who retire but assume other positions, we can designate many 
of these retirements as strategic departures to avoid electoral defeat.21 
This leaves very little evidence that MCs do not desire re-election.  
                                                                                                                 
19
 See PAUL FRYMER, UNEASY ALLIANCES: RACE AND PARTY COMPETITION IN AMERICA, 
27, 40–46 (1999) (using the term “capture” to discuss how parties marginalize minority 
interests). 
20
 According to James Sterling Young, “[f]or the first four decades of national 
government between one third and two thirds of the congressional community left every two 
years not to return. . . . [O]n the average, the biennial turnover was 41.5 percent of the total 
membership . . . .” JAMES STERLING YOUNG, THE WASHINGTON COMMUNITY 1800–1828, 89, 
90–91 (1966). 
21
 See, e.g., GARY C. JACOBSON & SAMUEL KERNELL, STRATEGY AND CHOICE IN 
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 49 (2d ed. 1983) (“It is difficult to believe . . . that vulnerability 
does not occasionally contribute to retirement decisions . . . .”); Walter J. Stone, Sarah A. 
Fulton, Cherie D. Maestas & L. Sandy Maisel, Incumbency Reconsidered: Prospects, Strategic 
Retirement, and Incumbent Quality in U.S. House Elections, 72 J. POL.178, 185 (2010) 
(“[V]ariables that affect incumbents’ decisions about running or retiring may also influence 
their vote share in the general election.”); Timothy Groseclose & Keith Krehbiel, Golden 
Parachutes, Rubber Checks, and Strategic Retirements from the 102d House, 38 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 75, 89 (1994) (discussing the variables involved in an incumbent’s decision to retire); 
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We can also look to many of the features of the modern Congress, 
which some have argued were chosen by MCs themselves as tools to 
facilitate re-election, for additional evidence of the desire for re-
election.22 Mayhew argued that many of the features of the modern 
Congress—including the committee system, the taking of roll-call 
votes, and the ability to send franked mail—have been adopted 
primarily to facilitate MCs’ re-election.23 The embeddedness of these 
features suggests that MCs continue to desire re-election. 
ASSUMPTION 3: MCS’ RE-ELECTION REQUIRES ATTENTION TO 
CITIZENS’ CONCERNS 
Working from the assumption that MCs are re-election seekers, the 
potential of electoral punishment for failing to represent constituents’ 
policy preferences provides an incentive to cast roll-call votes in line 
with constituents’ wishes.24 In fact, the threat of electoral punishment 
is the primary basis of policy representation: “we believe that 
constituents’ preferences are reflected in a representative’s voting (if 
at all) primarily through his concern for his electoral survival.”25 Prior 
studies have documented that MCs whose voting patterns diverge 
from the preferred direction of their district are less likely to be re-
elected, or are re-elected by narrower margins.26 Moreover, after MCs 
                                                                                                                 
 
Jennifer Wolak, Strategic Retirements: The Influence of Public Preferences On Voluntary 
Departures from Congress, 32 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 285, 301 (2007) (“[F]or members of the House, 
perceptions of the nation’s economic health influence rates of voluntary departure.”). 
22
 See DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 81–82 (1974) 
(arguing that “the organization of Congress meets remarkably well the electoral needs of its 
members. To put it another way, if a group of planners sat down and tried to design a pair of 
American national assemblies with the goal of serving members’ electoral needs year in and 
year out, they would be hard pressed to improve on what exists.”). 
23
 Id. at 84–97. 
24
 See MORRIS FIORINA, REPRESENTATIVES, ROLL CALLS, AND CONSTITUENCIES 29–40 
(1974); see also Donald R. Matthews & James A. Stimson, Decision–Making by U.S. 
Representatives: A Preliminary Model, in POLITICAL DECISION–MAKING 14, 16–17 (S. Sydney 
Ulmer ed., 1970) (arguing that “congressmen attempt to cast their votes so as to enhance the 
chances of achieving their goals [primary among them is re-election]. . . . The potential payoffs 
to congressmen for casting roll–call votes in a reasonably rational way are so great and the 
potential risks of following any other course so large, that the members try, and try hard, to be 
reasonable.”) (emphasis in original). 
25
 FIORINA, supra note 24, at 31. 
26
 Brandice Canes–Wrone, David W. Brady, & John F. Cogan, Out of Step, Out of Office: 
Electoral Accountability and House Members’ Voting, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 127, 132–33 
(2002) (providing data showing the effect of roll-call votes on electoral results); Stephen 
Ansolabehere & Philip Edward Jones, Constituents’ Responses to Congressional Roll-Call 
Voting, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 583, 591–92 (2010) (providing data showing the effect of roll-call 
votes on voter choice); John D. Griffin, Brian Newman & David Nickerson, Voting Power, 
Policy Representation, and Disparities in Voting’s Rewards (Mar. 1, 2012) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with authors) (discussing the effects of roll-call votes on elections).  
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announce their intention to retire and are no longer bound by the 
threat of re-election, their votes begin to diverge more from their 
district’s preferred direction.27 
ASSUMPTION 4: MCS ATTEND TO CITIZENS’ CONCERNS USING ROLL 
CALLS  
One of the chief tools that MCs use to increase their appeal to 
constituents is the roll-call vote. As David Mayhew argued, in their 
constant quest for re-election, elected officials benefit from 
opportunities to “tailor [their] positions” on the issues of the day.28 
One visible, credible way for an official to take a position is to cast a 
recorded, public vote. Indeed, roll-call voting is an optional feature of 
House procedure.29 Mayhew’s argument is that the adoption of the 
House roll-call rule is evidence that MCs view roll-call voting as an 
opportunity to take positions that their constituents (or some 
substantial subset of them) will look favorably on.30 Candidates 
challenging incumbents typically try to take advantage of any roll-call 
votes that may be unpopular in the electoral district. For example, 
several candidates in the 2010 elections focused their campaigns on 
incumbents’ votes for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), 
President Barack Obama’s economic stimulus package, the health 
care overhaul, or an energy reform package dubbed “cap and trade” 
legislation, each of which had become unpopular in many districts of 
the House of Representatives. These roll-call votes appear to have 
cost incumbents votes at the ballot box.31 
                                                                                                                 
27
 Lawrence S. Rothenberg & Mitchell S. Sanders, Severing the Electoral Connection: 
Shirking in the Contemporary Congress, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 316, 321 (2000) (“[T]he expected 
Ideological Change for retiring members and for political aspirants is (respectively) 52 and 44 
percent larger than for continuing members.”) (emphasis in original). 
28
 MAYHEW, supra note 22, at 64.  
29
 Not all votes are recorded roll–call votes. For example, a voice vote “means that 
lawmakers call out ‘yea’ or ‘nay’ on one side or the other when a questions is put by the 
presiding officer,” and there is no record of who voted or in what way they voted under division 
or standing votes. WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY 
PROCESS 177 (7th ed. 2007).   
30
 See also James M. Snyder, Jr. & Michael M. Ting, Roll Calls, Party Labels, and 
Elections, 11 POL. ANALYSIS 419, 422, 431 (2003) (formulating how the prospect of re-election 
affects legislator’s voting choices). 
31
 See David W. Brady, Morris P. Fiorina & Arjun S. Wilkins, The 2010 Elections: Why 
Did Political Science Forecasts Go Awry?, 44 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 247, 248 (2011) (noting 
that “a positive vote on health care appears to have had a negative impact on members’ vote 
shares in all but the most heavily Democratic districts.”); Brendan Nyhan, Eric McGhee, John 
Sides, Seth Masket & Steven Greene, One Vote Out of Step? The Effects of Salient Roll Call 
Votes in the 2010 Election, AM. POL. RES. (forthcoming) (discussing the effects of roll–call 
votes); Seth Masket & Steven Greene, The Price of Reform, HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 8, 2010, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/seth–masket/the–price–of–reform_b_755785.html (noting that 
roll-call votes have “clearly created a dynamic that has disadvantaged reform supporters in 
79
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ASSUMPTION 5: CITIZENS’ CONCERNS AND THEIR EXPECTED 
CONTRIBUTION TO MC RE-ELECTION VARY 
Despite some evidence that citizens are self-segregating along 
political lines32 and the conventional wisdom that many congressional 
districts are drawn to be relatively homogenous,33 the sizeable 
populations of congressional districts virtually guarantees that at least 
on some issues citizens within a district will disagree with one 
another. Indeed, this was precisely Madison’s antidote to cure the 
“mischiefs of faction,” or groups of citizens who agree with each 
other on virtually all the matters of the day—a republic with large 
constituencies.34  
As noted above, when their constituents do not agree with each 
other MCs have incentives to dole out strategically whatever 
resources are at their disposal that may shift constituents’ views of the 
MC, focusing such efforts on likely voters who are convertible. The 
probability of turning out to vote varies across the public.35 In 
addition, some groups in the American public are more convertible 
than others. This will mean that voting power varies across the public.  
ASSUMPTION 6: MCS IDENTIFY CITIZEN SUBGROUPS BY CONCERN 
AND VOTING POWER 
We maintain that it is plausible that MCs can identify citizens’ 
voting power. From sources such as the census, voter files, polls, and 
just spending time in the district, it is not difficult for MCs and their 
staffs to ascertain the demographic profile of their district, the general 
likelihood that members of various groups in the district will vote, 
and whether those groups typically vote for the member’s party, the 
opposition party, or vacillate between them. For example, Fenno 
observed that “House members describe their districts’ internal 
                                                                                                                 
 
conservative districts.”); Eric McGhee, Brendan Nyhan & John Sides, Midterm Postmortem, 
BOS. REV., Nov. 11, 2010, http://bostonreview.net/BR35.6/sides.php (finding that a 
“Democratic incumbent in the average district represented by Democratic incumbents actually 
lost about two–thirds of a percentage point for every yes vote.”). 
32
 See BEN BISHOP AND ROBERT G. CUSHING, THE BIG SORT: WHY THE CLUSTERING OF 
LIKE–MINDED IN AMERICA IS TEARING US APART 9 (2009) (discussing political segregation). 
33
 But see Alan I. Abramowitz, Brad Alexander & Matthew Gunning, Incumbency, 
Redistricting, and the Decline of Competition in U.S. House Elections, 68 J. POL. 75, 75 (2006) 
(arguing that redistricting has not contributed to the decline in electoral competition). 
34
 James Madison, Federalist 10, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 122–128 (Isaac Kramnick ed., 
Penguin Books 1987) (1788).   
35
 See SIDNEY VERBA, KAY LEHMAN SCHOLZMAN & HENRY E. BRADY, VOICE AND 
EQUALITY: CIVIC VOLUNTARISM IN AMERICAN POLITICS, 190, 233 (1995) (breaking down voter 
activity by race and class). 
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makeup using political science’s most familiar demographic and 
political variables: socioeconomic structure, ideology, ethnicity, 
residential patterns, religion, partisanship, stability, diversity, etc. 
Every congressman, in his mind’s eye, sees his geographical 
constituency in terms of some special configuration of such 
variables.”36 
HYPOTHESIS 1: MC VOTING FAVORS THOSE WITH MORE VOTING 
POWER  
MCs’ re-election incentives, in the face of an electorate with 
diverse preferences and unequal likelihood of affecting the election 
outcome, will lead them to attend to some constituents’ concerns 
more than those of others. All else equal, MCs must focus their re-
election efforts on those with the greatest potential to deliver their re-
election.37 If so, constituents with greater voting power (i.e., likely 
voters and convertible voters), should enjoy more policy 
representation than those with less voting power. By policy 
representation, we mean the match between a constituent’s preferred 
action and their representative’s actual behavior. According to 
Bartels, “disparities in the force of . . . [candidates’] strategic 
imperative [to compete for individuals’ votes] can produce disparities 
in electoral influence.”38 If re-election concerns are the primary 
motivation for policy representation and if roll calls are a resource to 
gain support, when casting roll-call votes, MCs should try to appeal to 
those who will most affect the MC’s re-election chances.  
A number of studies support this contention, showing that voters 
are generally better represented than those who tend not to vote.39 
                                                                                                                 
36
 RICHARD F. FENNO JR., HOME STYLE: HOUSE MEMBERS IN THEIR DISTRICTS 2 (1978). 
37
 This is a ceteris paribus claim, since co–partisanship, ideology, and other factors also 
affect the quality of representation. See, e.g., Charles S. Bullock III & David W. Brady, Party, 
Constituency, and Roll-Call Voting in the U. S. Senate, 8 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 29, 38–39 (1983) 
(providing models of constituency influences, party, Americans for Democratic Action, and 
Conservative Coalition support in the 93rd Senate).  
38
 Bartels, supra note 7, at 48. 
39
 See e.g., WILLIAM R. KEECH, THE IMPACT OF NEGRO VOTING: THE ROLE OF THE VOTE 
IN THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY 48–79 (1968) (discussing the impact of African Americans’ votes 
on various aspects of social and political life); John D. Griffin & Brian Newman, Are Voters 
Better Represented?, 67 J. POL. 1206, 1215, 1219–20 (2005) (discussing the impact of voter, 
nonvoter, senator, and “communicator” ideology on roll-call voting); Kim Quaile Hill, Jan E. 
Leighley, & Angela Hinton–Andersson, Lower-Class Mobilization and Policy Linkage in the 
U.S. States, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 75, 79–81 (1995) (“[P]rovid[ing] evidence . . . on the direct 
relationship between lower-class mobilization and welfare policy.”); Paul S. Martin, Voting’s 
Rewards: Voter Turnout, Attentive Publics, and Congressional Allocation of Federal Money, 47 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 110, 117–19 (2003) (providing statistics on voters’ influence over changes in 
federal grant expenditures). But see Christopher R. Ellis, Joseph Daniel Ura & Jenna Ashley–
Robinson, The Dynamic Consequences of Nonvoting in American National Elections, 59 POL. 
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Finding that voters are better represented relates to one piece of 
Bartels’ notion of voting power (that pertaining to turnout 
propensity), but these studies do not speak to whether convertible 
voters are especially well represented. We provide a first test of the 
hypothesis that those with greater voting power, defined more 
comprehensively, are better represented. 
ASSUMPTION 8: MCS DO NOT ATTEND TO THE CONCERNS OF 
NONVOTERS  
There are reasons to believe that elected officials are blind to the 
policy concerns of nonvoters. For example, in our study of U.S. 
Senators, we demonstrated that nonvoters’ opinions have no 
independent effect on Senators’ roll-call behavior.40 This lack of 
responsiveness to nonvoters may be owing to elected officials’ willful 
ignorance of nonvoters. After all, “[t]he blunt truth is that politicians 
and officials are under no compulsion to pay much heed to classes 
and groups of citizens that do not vote.”41 Or, more benignly, because 
nonvoters are less likely to communicate with officials, officials have 
less occasion to learn of nonvoters’ concerns.42 Therefore, “[t]hose in 
public life are more likely to be aware of, and to pay attention to, the 
needs and preferences of those who are active.”43 In either case, the 
lesson is, “if you don’t vote, you don’t count.”44 
HYPOTHESIS 2: THE REWARDS OF VOTING DIFFER ACROSS 
POLITICALLY RELEVANT GROUPS 
The second hypothesis stems directly from citizens’ unequal 
voting power. If elected officials value the votes of some individuals 
more than others, within groups whose votes are less valued the 
policy rewards of voting will be lower than the rewards within groups 
                                                                                                                 
 
RES. Q. 227, 231–32 (2006) (“We . . . find little evidence that policymakers respond 
disproportionately to the policy preferences of the electorate, ignoring the large segment of the 
public that does not vote.”). 
40
 See Griffin & Newman, supra note 39, at 1215 (providing statistics on the effect of 
voter and nonvoter ideology on roll-call voting). 
41
 V.O. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION 527 (1949).   
42
 See Griffin & Newman, supra note 39, at 1207–08, 1219–21 (“Elected officials will 
have a hard time representing the opinions of individuals who do not communicate their 
views.”); Warren E. Miller & Donald E. Stokes, Constituency Influence in Congress, 57 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 45, 52 (1963) (“Representative’s perceptions and attitudes are more strongly 
associated with the attitude of his electoral majority than they are with the attitudes of the 
constituency as a whole.”) (emphasis in the original). 
43
 VERBA, SCHLOZMAN, & BRADY, supra note 35, at 163. 
44
 Walter Dean Burnham, The Turnout Problem, in ELECTIONS AMERICAN STYLE 97, 99 
(A. James Reichley ed., 1987). 
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whose support is more sought after. Recall Assumption 8 that elected 
officials do little to appeal to the preferences of nonvoters regardless 
of the voting power of the groups to which they belong. If officials’ 
roll-call decisions are shaped more by the opinions of voters who 
belong to groups with more voting power than by voters with less 
voting power, then we should expect the policy representation of 
voters and nonvoters to be less distinguishable within groups with 
less voting power. That is, the rewards of voting will be unequal 
across groups.  
CALCULATING GROUP VOTING POWER 
Larry Bartels offers a relatively straightforward method of 
calculating the voting power of individuals using national public 
opinion surveys.45 We adopt this method, using the 2004 National 
Annenberg Election Survey (NAES).46 This survey offers a very large 
number of respondents (roughly seventy thousand) with which to 
work, enabling us to examine smaller subgroups of citizens than 
many surveys allow. The first part of the calculation involves 
estimating an individual’s probability of turning out to vote. This is 
relatively simple.47 The second part of the calculation estimates the 
extent to which a voter is convertible (meaning she could vote for 
either party’s candidate), conditional on turning out to vote at all. This 
requires initially estimating the probability that an individual will vote 
for the Democratic candidate,48 and then “folding” the scale at the 
                                                                                                                 
45
 See Bartels, supra note 6, at 47–50 (describing his method of calculation in detail).  
46
 DANIEL ROMER, KATE KENSKI, KENNETH WINNEG, CHRISTOPHER ADASIEWICZ, & 
KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, CAPTURING CAMPAIGN DYNAMICS 2000 & 2004: THE NATIONAL 
ANNENBERG ELECTION SURVEY 14–19 (2006). 
47
 See Bartels, supra note 7, at 47–50, 69–73, setting out the method as follows: 
Estimating an individual’s probability of turning out to vote is done via a basic probit model, a 
statistical method that takes as the dependent variable whether a survey respondent reported 
voting or not voting. The model’s independent variables consist of the strength of the 
respondent’s party identification (i.e., 0 = independent, 1 = independent “leaning” toward one of 
the two major parties, 2 = a “not strong” Democrat or Republican, and 3 = “strong” Democrat or 
Republican), a series of indicator variables for African Americans, Southern African Americans, 
southern residence, eastern residence, western residence, residence in a city, residence in a 
suburb (each taking on the value of 1 if a respondent fits in a category and 0 otherwise), the 
number of children in the household, respondent’s age, respondent’s age squared, respondent’s 
sex, respondent’s educational attainment, respondent’s household income, whether anyone in 
the household is a union member, the respondent’s attendance of religious services, whether the 
respondent is Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish, and the strength of the respondent’s preference for 
one presidential candidate over the other. This model uses the information from almost 70,000 
respondents to estimate the probability that each individual turned out to vote based on the 
variables in the model.   
48
 Estimation of the probability that an individual voted for the Democrat is accomplished 
via a method similar to estimating the probability of turnout described in supra note 43. Vote 
choice probabilities are estimated via a probit model with the dependent variable equal to one if 
an individual claimed to have voted for John Kerry and zero otherwise. The independent 
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value of .5 so that individuals very likely or very unlikely to vote for 
the Republican would have very low values and those respondents 
with a 50 percent probability of voting for the Republican would have 
the highest value.49 This calculation generates a 0 to 50 scale, which 
we multiplied by two so that both the probability of turnout and the 
swing-voter scales extend from 0 to 100. An individual’s voting 
power, then, is the product of these two numbers, divided by 100 so 
that voting power again theoretically ranges from 0 to 100.50  
The first column of entries in Table 1 infra displays the average 
probability of turnout for various groups based on these calculations. 
Compared to individuals who identify as being a Republican or 
Democrat, independents are less likely to vote. Copartisans 
(individuals whose member of the House of Representatives is a 
member of the same political party the respondent identifies with) 
have an 85 percent probability of voting. Copartisan constituents 
generally enjoy high levels of policy representation, a point which 
will be more important below.51 Similarly, outpartisans (individuals 
who identify with one party and whose House member affiliates with 
the other major party) have an 84 percent probability of turning out to 
vote. In contrast, independents (who by definition cannot be 
copartisans or outpartisans) have only a 76 percent chance of voting. 
Although these figures illustrate the well-known tendency of surveys 
to overestimate turnout, as these figures well exceed observed 
behavior in presidential-year voter participation, they comport well 
with previous studies of turnout finding that independents tend to be 
less likely to vote than partisans.52 
                                                                                                                 
 
variables are the same as those in the probability of turnout model except the vote choice model 
excludes the strength of partisanship and the strength of the individual’s preference for one 
candidate over the other.   
49
 Specifically, we took the absolute value of .50-probability of vote for Democrat and 
then multiplied the resulting value by –1.   
50
 For an even more precise measure of voting power, we could incorporate the size of the 
group in the electoral unit. We do not, however, possess district-level data on age and 
partisanship. See also John D. Griffin & Brian Newman, Voting Power, Policy Representation, 
and Disparities in Voting’s Rewards 8–15 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with The Case 
Western Reserve University Law Review), where we included group size in calculating the 
voting power of racial/ethnic groups and obtained results similar to those we report here. 
51
 See, e.g., Bullock & Brady, supra note 37, at 38–39 (providing models of constituency 
influences, party, Americans for Democratic Action, and Conservative Coalition support in the 
93rd Senate); Joshua D. Clinton, Representation in Congress: Constituents and Roll Calls in the 
106th House, 68 J. POL. 397, 403–04 (2006) (providing statistics on roll call behavior and 
constituency preferences).   
52
 See Paul R. Abramson & John H. Aldrich, The Decline of Electoral Participation in 
America, 76 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 502, 506–09 (1982) (discussing statistics on party identification 
and turnout); Timothy J. Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, The Swing Voter's Curse, 86 AM. 
ECON. REV. 408, 418 (1996) (“Empirical work has . . . demonstrated that independent voters are 
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Differences in the probability of voting are especially stark when 
we look at young voters as compared to the rest of the public. 
Citizens over thirty years of age have an average probability of voting 
of 86 percent, far above the 51 percent chance of voting for the 
average citizen under thirty. These estimates again comport well with 
prior research on age and turnout.53 Finally, as is well documented 
elsewhere, African Americans and Latinos are less likely to vote than 
are whites.54 On average, whites have a probability of voting of 82 
percent, compared to 76 percent for African Americans and 63 
percent for Latinos.55  
The second column of values in Table 1 reflects the average for 
each group’s tendency to be a convertible group—that is, open to 
voting for either party’s candidate. There are significant differences 
across groups on this measure as well. As we might guess, individuals 
who say they consider themselves a Republican or Democrat are 
relatively non–convertible, with average scores of about 10 on the 0 
to 100 scale. In contrast, independents, the quintessential swing 
voters, are far more convertible. Their average score of 73 is the 
largest of any group we examine. In contrast, there is little difference 
in the scores of young voters compared to other voters (31 vs. 29).  
There are also significant differences in the convertibility of 
racial/ethnic groups.56 Whites are the most convertible, with an 
average score of 30. Latinos are a very close second (29), while 
                                                                                                                 
 
much more likely to abstain than partisans.”). The well-known tendency for surveys to over-
estimate turnout rates, see e.g., Jeffrey A. Karp & David Brockington, Social Desirability and 
Response Validity: A Comparative Analysis of Overreporting Voter Turnout in Five Countries, 
67 J. POL. 825, 830 (2005) (providing statistics on overreporting in various countries), does not 
cause problems for the type of analysis we employ here. See Griffin & Newman, supra note 39, 
at 1212–1213, 1224–1225 (citation omitted) (“[T]he error in independent variables induced by 
overreporting only leads to minor biases in models of turnout and candidate choice.”).  
53
 Wattenberg reports that the turnout rate for voters sixty–five years old and older 
outpaces that of voters between twenty–one and twenty–four years old by a ratio of 1.3 to 1 to 
as much as 2 to 1 from 1964 to 2004. See MARTIN P. WATTENBERG, IS VOTING FOR YOUNG 
PEOPLE? 91 (3d ed., 2012).   
54
 See, e.g., VERBA, SCHLOZMAN, & BRADY, supra note 35, 232–33 (providing statistics 
on voting habits by racial/ethnic groups).  
55
 The NAES sampled some Latinos who were not citizens. We excluded these 
respondents since they are ineligible to vote. If we included non-citizens, the average probability 
of turning out among Latinos would be lower. 
56
 Over the last three decades, whites have been far more evenly split between the major 
party candidates for president than were African Americans. In the eight presidential elections 
from 1980 to 2008 on average, 42.6 percent of whites voted for the Democrat. In contrast, over 
this period, an average of 90 percent of African Americans voted for the Democrat in the race. 
Although Latinos also tend to support Democrats, they have done so at lower rates than African 
Americans, as 66 percent of Latino voters pulled the lever for the Democrat over this period. 
See Exit Polls, N.Y. TIMES, http://elections.nytimes.com/2008/results/president/exitpolls.html 
(last visited Mar. 5, 2012) (reporting this data). 
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African Americans are far less convertible (16). That is, whites are 
approximately twice as convertible as African Americans. The low 
score for African Americans supports the notion that African 
Americans as a group are a largely “captured” constituency of the 
Democratic Party and unable to be persuaded by Republicans.57 
Bartels found similar estimates, concluding that African Americans 
are “by far the least pivotal group in the American electorate.”58  
Multiplying the average probabilities of turnout by the average 
convertibility scores provides us with a more comprehensive estimate 
of each group’s average voting power (see the third column of Table 
1). According to this measure, independents have about five times as 
much voting power as partisans (56 vs. 10), while those under thirty 
years of age have only about 60 percent of the voting power of the 
rest of the public (16 vs. 25). Along the same lines, African 
Americans have about one-half the voting power of whites (12 vs. 
24), while Latinos have about two-thirds the voting power of whites 
(18 vs. 24). Although all votes legally count the same, some votes are 
more valuable to candidates than others. More specifically, 
independent, non-young, white votes are more valuable to candidates 
than partisan, young, minority votes. 
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 FRYMER, supra note 19, at 40–46. 
58
 Bartels, supra note 7, at 65. 
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Table 1: Average Voting Power of Groups 
 
Probability 
of Turnout Convertibility
Voting 
Power 
Win 
Percentage 
All 80.6 29.0 23.4 55.2 
     
Copartisans 84.7 9.8 8.3 62.6 
Outpartisans 83.6 11.9 9.9 46.3 
Independents 75.9 73.4 55.7 53.9 
     
Under 30 50.7 30.6 15.5 53.8 
30 and Over 85.7 28.8 24.7 55.4 
     
African 
American 76.0 15.5 11.8 51.3 
Latino 62.9 29.1 18.3 49.3 
White 81.6 29.9 24.4 55.8 
Source: 2008 National Annenberg Election Survey. Each scale ranges from 0 to 100. 
Each cell represents the group average as calculated by the authors. 
VOTING POWER MATTERS FOR POLICY REPRESENTATION 
The differences in voting power displayed in Table 1 matter 
because MCs tend to vote in concert with the preferences of their 
constituents who have more voting power. Individuals with more 
voting power tend to get more of what they want from their MCs. To 
show this, we created a summary measure of each individual’s policy 
representation. As noted above, we define policy representation as the 
degree to which an individual’s MC casts roll-call votes as the 
individual would prefer. Thus, our measure requires knowing how 
individuals would prefer MCs to vote and how their MCs actually 
voted. The 2004 NAES asked respondents their preferred policy in 
several issue domains and identifies their congressional district. In the 
subsequent two years, during the 109th Congress (2005-2006), 
several of those issues came up for a roll-call vote in the U.S. House 
of Representatives.59 In particular, of the twenty-four “key votes” of 
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 It is critical that the constituency preferences be collected prior to the MCs’ roll-call 
votes. Evidence suggests that in some cases, MC votes on a particular issue affect their 
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the 109th Congress, as identified by Congressional Quarterly, there 
were nine roll-call votes we can match to constituency preferences.60 
For these votes, we know how constituents wanted their MC to vote 
and we know how their MC voted. On each vote, we count a 
constituent a “winner” if her MC voted as she preferred. For example, 
if a constituent said she opposes the federal government negotiating 
more free trade agreements and her MC voted against the Central 
American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), the constituent is a 
winner on this roll–call vote. In contrast, if a constituent’s MC voted 
in opposition to the constituent’s preference (the constituent opposes 
free trade agreements, but her MC voted in favor of CAFTA), the 
constituent is a “loser” on this roll-call vote.61 We then calculated the 
proportion of roll-call votes on which each individual was a “winner” 
and multiplied this ratio by 100. We term this 0 to 100 scale “win 
percentage.”62  
As Table 1 shows, the average win percentage is 55. However, 
there is also significant variation across the groups included in Table 
1.63 A central feature of this variation relates to copartisanship. 
Studies of policy representation routinely find that copartisans’ 
                                                                                                                 
 
constituents’ preferences on that issue. See Kim Quaile Hill & Patricia A. Hurley, Dyadic 
Representation Reappraised, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 109, 121, 125 (1999) (providing models on 
constituency social welfare and civil rights preferences); Patricia A. Hurley & Kim Quaile Hill, 
Beyond the Demand-Input Model: A Theory of Representational Linkages, 65 J. POL. 304, 318–
21 (2003) (providing and discussing statistics on dyadic representational linkages on domestic 
welfare policy). If we measure constituency preferences after roll–call votes have been cast, a 
relationship between constituency preferences and MC roll-call votes may not mean that MCs 
are responding to constituent preferences, but that MCs are persuading their constituents and 
shaping their preferences.   
60
 See Weekly Index, 64 CQ WKLY. 65, 145 (2006) (providing statistical information about 
the “key votes”); Weekly Index, 65 CQ WKLY. 1, 85 (2007) (same).   
61
 If Congressional Quarterly identified a member as not voting but “stated for,” we treat 
the vote as if the member voted yea, and similarly if the member was reported as “stating 
against,” we treat the vote as if the member voted nay. We ignore abstaining members for 
purposes of that particular roll-call vote. 
62
 We analyze only those respondents who answered enough items to be classified as a 
winner or loser on at least three roll-call votes. This eliminates some of our sample, but this is 
preferable to including individuals who were winners (or losers) on a single vote and therefore 
look as though they were winners (or losers) on all nine votes. Ultimately, our findings are 
similar regardless of where we draw the cutoff line for excluding citizens. 
63
 The variation in policy representation reflected in Table 1 mirrors fairly closely 
variation in policy representation uncovered in previous analyses using different measures of 
policy representation. See LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF THE NEW GILDED AGE 257–67 (2008) (providing and discussing statistics on 
MCs’ responsiveness to various groups); JOHN D. GRIFFIN & BRIAN NEWMAN, MINORITY 
REPORT: EVALUATING POLITICAL EQUALITY IN AMERICA 64–69, 80–95 (2008) (discussing 
various groups in relation to policy outcomes and MC responsiveness); Martin Gilens, 
Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness, 69 PUB. OPINION Q. 778, 785–89 (2005) 
(discussing policy outcomes in relation to different income groups). 
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preferences are far more often reflected in MCs’ roll-call voting than 
is the case for non-copartisans.64 Our data show the same: copartisans 
have an average win percentage of 63 percent, 8 points above the 
overall average (55 percent) and 13 points above the average of the 
rest of the public (50 percent). Political scientists have argued for 
decades that one of the ways policy representation arises is through 
voters’ selection of likeminded MCs.65 When constituents elect an 
MC who thinks as the constituents do and shares many important 
policy preferences, when policies come up for a vote, if the MC 
“votes her conscience,” she is also voting as those constituents prefer. 
In many cases, copartisan constituents will elect likeminded MCs, 
giving copartisans especially high win percentages. Note that this 
explanation for copartisans’ high win percentage is independent of 
voting power; copartisans’ high win percentages do not derive from 
their voting power, but from another source. Since copartisans have 
much less voting power than independents, but have high win 
percentages for other reasons, we control for copartisanship as we 
continue to examine the relationship between voting power and policy 
representation. In addition, we will return to the 13-point difference 
between the win percentages of copartisans and others as a 
benchmark throughout our discussion.  
Controlling for copartisanship, individuals with higher voting 
power enjoy higher win percentages.66 Perhaps the best way to see 
this is to compare the estimated win percentage of individuals with 
relatively low and relatively high levels of voting power. For 
example, an individual at the 25th percentile of voting power is 
estimated to have a win percentage 3.25 points lower than an 
individual at the 75th percentile of voting power. If we move to 
individuals at the 10th and 90th percentiles of the voting power 
distribution, the difference rises to 7 points.  
To provide a sense of how big a 3- or 7-point difference in win 
percentage is, we refer to two benchmarks. The first, defined above, is 
the 13-point difference in win percentage between copartisans and the 
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 See Bullock & Brady, supra note 37, at 38–39 (providing models of constituency 
influences, party, Americans for Democratic Action, and Conservative Coalition support in the 
93rd Senate); Clinton, supra note 50, at 403–04 (providing statistics on roll call behavior and 
constituency preferences). 
65
 See, e.g., Miller & Stokes, supra note 42, at 52; Robert S. Erikson, Roll Calls, 
Reputations, and Representation in the U.S. Senate, 15 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 623, 634 (1990); 
Griffin & Newman, supra note 39, at 1219. 
66
 Specifically, we regressed win percentage on voting power and an indicator variable for 
copartisanship. As expected, copartisanship was highly significant, both substantively and 
statistically (p < .001). The model estimates that co—partisans have win percentages 15 points 
higher than others. The unstandardized coefficient for voting power is .11, with a standard error 
of .006. The coefficient is statistically significant at the .001 level. 
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rest of the public, one of the largest differences we observe anywhere 
in this study. The second benchmark relates to income groups. Many 
recent studies have found that high income earners are more likely to 
see their preferred outcomes favored by government decision makers 
than are low income earners.67 Many are deeply troubled by these 
findings. The American Political Science Association even formed a 
task force to examine the issue.68 Like earlier studies, our data find 
income and policy representation are linked. Dividing the sample into 
three income groups of roughly the same size, we find that high-
income earners have win percentages 2 points higher than low income 
earners, on average. Given the great scholarly and political attention 
paid to the income gap in representation, we take it as another 
important benchmark to employ in our analysis.  
Returning now to the 3- or 7-point gaps relating to voting power, 
we see that both are larger than the gaps between high- and low-
income earners. In addition, the 7-point win percentage gap between 
the 10th and 90th percentile is roughly half the size of the difference 
between copartisans and non-copartisans. That is, being on the high 
end of the voting power scale brings a policy representation 
advantage about half the size of being able to choose the party of 
one’s MC. In short, voting power matters because constituents with 
higher voting power tend to have higher win percentages.69 
GROUP VOTING POWER AND GROUP REPRESENTATION 
Summing up the results so far, we have seen that different groups 
have different levels of voting power and that voting power generally 
is related to policy representation. In this section, we show that 
groups with low voting power tend also to enjoy less policy 
representation. That is, despite the one person, one vote principle, 
                                                                                                                 
67
 See Gilens, supra note 63, at 789 (noting that “government policy appears to be fairly 
responsive to the well–off and virtually unrelated to the desires of the low– and middle–income 
citizens.”); BARTELS, supra note 63, at 257–267 (exploring the extent to which the 
responsiveness of senators to public opinion reflects differential responsiveness to the senators’ 
affluent constituents).   
68
 See INEQUALITY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: WHAT WE KNOW AND WHAT WE 
NEED TO LEARN 1 (Lawrence R. Jacobs & Theda Skocpol eds., 2005) (concluding that public 
officials are more responsive to privileged citizens who are well organized and participate in 
politics, compared to less affluent citizens).  
69
 Controlling for other factors known to affect policy representation does not affect this 
key finding. If we control for copartisanship, respondents’ race/ethnicity, sex, age, and income, 
along with the consistency and popularity of their preferences, and the political heterogeneity of 
the district, we continue to find that voting power is substantively and statistically significant. 
The coefficient for voting power is slightly smaller, at .10 (standard error = .006, p < .001), 
meaning the difference in estimated win percentage between individuals at the 25th and 75th 
percentile shrinks slightly to 3.1 points. The difference between 10th and 90th percentiles 
shrinks slightly to 6.6 points.   
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political factors make some votes more valuable to candidates with 
the consequence that some groups get more of what they want from 
government.  
The last column in Table 1 presents the averages for groups’ win 
percentages. We begin with partisan groups. Given that copartisans 
enjoy such effective policy representation independent of the group’s 
voting power, the best way to observe voting power’s impact among 
partisan groups is to compare independents to outpartisans. Recall 
that independents have far greater voting power than outpartisans. As 
Table 1 shows, independents also enjoy higher win percentages. The 
average win percentage for outpartisans (46) is 8 points lower than 
the average for independents (54).70 This 8-point difference is again 
about half the size of the effect of copartisanship we saw above and 
much larger than the income gap in policy representation. 
Table 1 also shows that young citizens, who have less voting 
power than their older counterparts, also have somewhat lower win 
percentages. Those under thirty had an average win percentage of 
53.8, compared to 55.4, a difference of about 1.5 points. This 
difference is much smaller than the gap between copartisans and 
others and is smaller than the income gap. However, even slightly 
lower win percentages based solely on age may be cause for concern.  
Finally, recall that African Americans and Latinos have less voting 
power than do white citizens. Table 1 shows that minority groups also 
have lower average win percentages than do whites. On average, 
whites have a win percentage just under 56. In contrast, African 
Americans’ average win percentage is 51, 4.5 points lower than 
whites’ average win percentage. Latinos’ win percentage is even 
lower on average, at just above 49, 6.5 points lower than that of 
whites. The gap between both minority groups and whites is larger 
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 The difference is statistically significant at the p < .001 level. It is important to point out 
a potential problem for our analyses. The figures we just cited were calculated from across all 
congressional districts. Such figures can be misleading. In order for groups to be represented 
unequally by a MC, the two groups must want the MC to do different things. If both groups 
want the MC to vote in favor of a bill, the MC cannot help but to represent both groups equally. 
Moreover, imagine a district where 75 percent of group A prefers a “yea” vote on a bill, while 
55 percent of group B prefers a “yea” vote. The district’s MC will represent both groups most 
effectively by casting a “yea” vote. By our measure, group A’s members will be better 
represented on average because 75 percent of the group prefers a “yea” vote. The MC could not 
have represented group B any better however by voting “nay.” Thus, when groups prefer the 
same roll-call vote, it does not make sense to say that the MC is advantaging one group over the 
other when she votes as majorities of each group prefer. If we want to see whether MCs side 
with one group against the other, we must look at instances where group A prefers a “yea” vote 
and group B prefers a “nay” vote. We can do this by analyzing only those congressional districts 
where one group’s average preference for the roll–call vote (yea or nay) differs from the average 
preference of the other group. We call these “conflict districts.” When we focus on these 
districts, we find results similar to those reported in Table 1 and below.    
85
1100 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:4 
than the income gap in win percentage and is between one-third and 
one-half the size of copartisanship’s effect.  
Of course, we are examining groups in isolation when in reality 
every constituent belongs to an ethnic or racial group, one of the party 
categories, and one of the age categories. When we take each of these 
factors into account, along with several other factors that affect policy 
representation, we continue to find that groups with less voting power 
experience lower win percentages.71 Taking partisanship, age, race, 
and ethnicity into account, independents have win percentages 8 
points higher than outpartisans, citizens under thirty have win 
percentages 1 point lower than older citizens, the average win 
percentage of African Americans is 3 points lower than that of whites, 
while the average win percentage of Latinos is 4.5 points lower than 
that of whites. In sum, groups with more voting power tend also to be 
better represented. 
THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING CONVERTIBLE 
When we unpack voting power into its two components, it 
becomes clear that being convertible in elections is the more 
important factor for policy representation. This is not to say that the 
probability that a citizen votes is irrelevant. Someone at the 25th 
percentile in terms of probability of turning out has a win percentage 
just over 1 point lower than a citizen who is at the 75th percentile. 
Moreover, there is a 2.5-point win percentage difference between 
those at the 10th and 90th percentile.  
Clearly, the probability of voting matters.72 Recall that 
independents are about 8 percentage points less likely to vote than 
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 Specifically, we estimated an OLS model with win percentage as the dependent 
variable and controlling for co—partisanship, respondents’ race/ethnicity, sex, age, and income, 
along with the consistency and popularity of their preferences and the political heterogeneity of 
the district.   
72
 See Griffin & Newman, supra note 39, at 1216–1217 (reporting the results of a study 
that shows while “Senators are disproportionately responsive to voters . . . . Senators do not 
respond to their nonvoting constituents at all, even when [the nonvoting constitutent] identif[ies] 
with the Senator’s party.”); Martin, supra note 39, at 116–122 (concluding that “counties that 
vote at higher rates are rewarded with higher per capita federal expenditures.”); Arend Lijphart, 
Unequal Participation: Democracy's Unresolved Dilemma Presidential Address, American 
Political Science Association, 1996, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1, 1 (1997) (noting that 
representation and influence are biased in favor of more privileged citizens, who engage in 
intensive modes of participations both at the conventional level, such as working in election 
campaigns and contributing money to parties or candidates, and unconventional level, like 
participating in boycotts, and blocking traffic); Sidney Verba, The Citizen as Respondent: 
Sample Surveys and American Democracy Presidential Address, American Political Science 
Association, 1995, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1, 1 (1996) (“There is a close connection between 
subject and method in this research, between citizen participation and representative 
democracy. . . .”). 
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partisans. Our results estimate that if independents were as likely to 
vote as partisans, they would gain about half a point on the win 
percentage scale. More significantly, recall that citizens under thirty 
are 35 percentage points less likely to vote compared to those over 
thirty. If younger citizens voted at rates equal to those over thirty, 
their policy representation would increase by an estimated 1.8 points. 
Remember that this is essentially the size of the existing age gap in 
representation. Finally, recall that Latinos are 19 percentage points 
less likely to vote than whites are. If Latinos equalized their 
probability of voting compared to whites, these figures estimate that 
their policy representation would increase by about a point.  
As much as the probability of voting matters for policy 
representation, being convertible matters more. Controlling for the 
effects of copartisanship, a citizen who is at the 25th percentile of the 
convertibility distribution will have a win percentage 4.5 points lower 
than someone at the 75th percentile. More dramatically, someone at 
the 10th percentile will have a win percentage 7.5 points lower than 
someone at the 90th percentile. Recall from above that independents 
are dramatically more convertible in elections compared to partisans. 
If independents were to become only as convertible as partisans, their 
win percentages would drop by an estimated 5.6 points. 
Recall also that African Americans are far less convertible than 
whites on average. If the average African American could somehow 
become as convertible as the average white voter, the average win 
percentage for African Americans would rise by an estimated 1.3 
points. Given that the total gap between the average win percentages 
of African Americans and whites is 4.5 points, the 1.3-point 
difference associated with being convertible is roughly one-third of 
the difference between the groups. Clearly, other factors are also at 
work in the dynamics of race and representation, but African 
Americans’ limited convertibility in elections appears to depress the 
degree to which this group gets what it wants from government.73  
NOT ALL VOTES BRING REWARDS 
Low levels of voting power point to a difficult challenge for 
groups that are traditionally disadvantaged in American politics. One 
of the most obvious strategies a group can adopt to gain greater 
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 In a model that controls for a host of other factors shaping policy representation, the 
estimated effect of probability of turnout falls short of traditional levels of statistical 
significance. In contrast, the estimated effect of being pivotal is virtually the same (a citizen at 
the 25th percentile is estimated to have a win percentage 4.25 points lower than an equivalent 
citizen at the 75th percentile, all else equal; the difference between the 90th and 10th percentiles 
is 7.4 points).   
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political clout is to vote at higher rates. Indeed, one of the chief goals 
of the Civil Rights Movement was to establish a secure franchise for 
minority groups so those groups could gain political voice. 
Empirically, evidence suggests that those who vote enjoy higher 
levels of policy representation.74 That is, voting brings rewards in 
terms of policy representation. Consequently, someone seeking to 
move toward greater equality in policy representation across groups 
might look to boosting turnout as an effective strategy. In fact, turning 
out to vote might be an especially powerful strategy for equalizing the 
policy representation of groups. Voting is a radically egalitarian way 
to participate in politics. Every person can only vote once. In contrast, 
wealthy individuals can donate huge sums in (uncoordinated) efforts 
to elect or defeat candidates for office, while poor individuals may 
not afford to donate any money.75  
However, one implication of voting power is that not all votes will 
reap the same rewards. If a group’s votes are less important to an MC 
seeking re-election than another group’s votes, the MC may seek to 
reward voters from that group less than she will reward voters from 
other groups with more voting power. Given the choice between 
rewarding the voters from a group with high voting power, a group 
especially important to the MC’s re-election prospects, and rewarding 
a group with low voting power, the MC will presumably reward 
voters from the high voting power group.  
We find some evidence that this is true. Independent voters have 
win percentages 4 points higher than independents who did not vote. 
In contrast, outpartisan voters were no better off than outpartisans 
who did not vote. In fact, they were a bit worse off. Young voters 
were a bit better represented than young nonvoters by 1.4 points, but 
older voters gained a bit more (2.3 points) over nonvoters.76  
Differences in voting’s rewards are especially significant for 
African Americans. Whites gain from voting. On average, white 
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 See Griffin & Newman, supra note 38, at 1215–1217 (discussing the results a study 
which “suggest that Senators are disproportionately responsive to voters”); Martin, supra note 
39, at 116–122 (noting that Senators do not respond to their nonvoting constituents, even if 
these constituents identify with the Senator’s party); Verba, supra note 72, at 1 (“But citizen 
[political] activity is perhaps the major way the public’s needs and preferences are 
communicated to governing elites.”); Lijphart, supra note 72, at 1 (noting that “unequal 
participation spells unequal influence”). 
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 See Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, Equal Protection and the Wealth Primary, 11 YALE 
L. & POL’Y REV. 273, (1993) (“Private money is a controlling force in American politics and 
government. . . . [M]onied interests organized around their relationship to wealth dominate the 
fundraising process that, to a large extent, determines which candidates for public office will 
win and what they will do once elected.”). 
76
 Each of the differences we describe in this paragraph is statistically significant at the 
.05 level (or less) using a two–tailed test. 
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voters’ win percentage is 3 points higher than white nonvoters’ 
average win percentage.77 Latino voters are also better represented 
than Latino nonvoters by about 4 points.78 In contrast, African 
Americans who vote are no better represented by their MCs than 
African Americans who do not vote. The difference between African 
American voters and nonvoters is so small (less than 1 point) that it is 
statistically insignificant, meaning that we cannot be sure there is any 
difference at all.79 Simply put, in contrast to whites, we cannot 
conclude that voting brings any representation benefit to African 
Americans. Thus, the franchise may prove to be a limited strategy to 
boost the policy representation of African Americans.  
AVENUES FOR REFORM 
We close by considering how the distribution of voting power 
might become more similar across groups. First, we note that the 
drawing of congressional districts to create majority-minority districts 
(MMDs), districts in which the majority of the population is non-
white, appears to have little impact on the distribution of voting 
power among African Americans. African Americans in MMDs are 2 
percentage points more likely to vote than African Americans in non-
MMDs, but are also 2 points less convertible than African Americans 
in non-MMDs. The win percentage of African Americans residing in 
MMDs is statistically indistinguishable from the win percentage of 
African Americans in other districts. MMDs have important 
consequences for minority representation,80 but they do not appear to 
affect African Americans’ voting power in any obvious way.  
Since voting power consists of two parts, changes to either could 
shift the distribution toward greater parity across groups. One 
potential reform that would virtually equalize the probability of 
voting across groups is to make voting mandatory, as it is in some 
other countries, like Australia, Austria, Belgium, and Singapore.81 As 
president of the American Political Science Association, Arend 
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 The difference is statistically significant at the .0001 level. 
78
 The difference is statistically significant at the .05 level. 
79
 The difference between the win percentage of African American voters and nonvoters is 
0.7 points, with a p–value of .75.   
80
 See, e.g., DAVID LUBLIN, THE PARADOX OF REPRESENTATION: RACIAL 
GERRYMANDERING AND MINORITY INTERESTS IN CONGRESS 23–38 (1997) (discussing the 
positive effect of the racial redistricting strategy on the election of new African–American 
representatives); Charles Cameron, David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, Do Majority–Minority 
Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 794, 
794 (1996) (discussing the role concentrated minority voting districts had on the rise of the 
‘theory of black electoral success’ in which minority interests have been advanced through the 
election of minority officials). 
81
 Norman Ornstein, Vote or Else, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.10, 2006, at A23.   
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Lijphart advocated for compulsory voting as a means of leveling the 
political clout of various groups in American politics.82 Others have 
occasionally advocated for compulsory voting in the United States as 
well.83 Aside from the low likelihood that politicians elected under 
current laws would adopt a dramatically different set of laws and the 
“libertarian belief prevalent in the United States against government 
interference in the decision to vote,” 84 other, less draconian, reforms 
could boost turnout in the United States. For example, some reforms 
could decrease the costs of registration, as the National Voter 
Registration Act of 1993, the so–called “motor voter” law, attempted 
to do.85 Potential reforms include allowing Election Day registration, 
eliminating voter identification laws, and allowing voters to register 
by mail or electronically. Such measures are estimated to have some, 
albeit sometimes relatively minor, effects on turnout rates.86 
Importantly, the effects of at least some of these reforms are 
estimated to have the greatest effect on turnout rates among citizens 
under thirty years old.87 
Although electoral changes may alter turnout rates, they may have 
a limited impact on groups’ relative political influence. First, as we 
saw above, of the two components of voting power, the probability of 
turnout has less effect on policy representation. Even if we equalized 
the probability of turnout across groups, significant differences in 
voting power would remain across racial groups and between 
independents and partisans. Second, we cannot be sure how newly 
mobilized voters would vote. There is a common assumption that 
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 Lijphart, supra note 72, at 8–10. 
83
 See Alan Wertheimer, In Defense of Compulsory Voting, in PARTICIPATION IN POLITICS 
276, 2–93 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1975) (“If I am right in suspecting that 
compulsory voting would not be accepted, it is not because it is not a good idea—rather, it 
would only confirm one of the major premises of the argument, that men are not always 
rational.”); Ornstein, supra note 81, at A23 (“Mandatory voting comes with a price: a modest 
loss of freedom. But this would be more than balanced by the revitalization of the rapidly 
vanishing center in American politics.”). 
84
 Richard L. Hasen, Voting Without Law?, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2135, 2174 (1996); see 
also Michael G. Colantuono, Comment, The Revision of American State Constitutions: 
Legislative Power, Popular Sovereignty, and Constitutional Change, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1473, 
1503 (1987) (“Compulsory voting is fundamentally inconsistent with the individualism of 
American political culture, and it seems doubtful that Americans would accept such a plan.”). 
85
 Pub. L. No. 103–31, 107 Stat. 77 (1993). 
86
 In their study of the effect of the so–called “motor voter” law, Highton and Wolfinger 
estimate that turnout increased by 4.7 percent through Colorado’s motor voter program and if all 
states permitted registration on Election Day, national turnout would increase by 8.7 percentage 
points. Benjamin Highton & Raymond E. Wolfinger, Estimating the Effects of the National 
Voter Registration Act of 1993, 20 POL. BEHAV. 79, 84, 87 (1998). Highton also finds that states 
with election-day registration had turnout 10 percentage points higher than other states. 
Benjamin Highton, Easy Registration and Voter Turnout, 59 J. POL. 565, 568–69 (1997). 
87
 Highton & Wolfinger, supra note 86, at 84, 87. 
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Democrats and progressive causes would benefit from increased 
turnout such that “if everybody in this country voted, the Democrats 
would be in for the next 100 years.”88 Analyses routinely find, 
however, that if everyone voted, electoral outcomes would be only 
modestly different.89 Since the act of participating in politics may 
alter some newly mobilized citizens’ political preferences, it is 
difficult to know exactly what the electorate would look like under 
conditions of increased turnout. In particular, it would be difficult to 
know how new voters’ convertibility scores would compare to their 
current scores. 
Another means of equalizing voting power would be to make 
groups that are currently “captured” by one party more convertible. 
The primary means of doing so are presumably by moving away from 
the current two-party system or by making “captured” groups more 
convertible within the current system. A move toward multiple 
political parties would presumably give groups more options so that if 
a party begins to ignore a group, the group can credibly threaten to 
vote for another party. If significant numbers of any group could 
conceivably vote for two or more different parties, members of the 
group are more convertible and therefore have more voting power. 
Various electoral reforms could encourage the development and 
electoral viability of multiple parties, including moves to proportional 
representation or cumulative voting rules and/or multi-member 
districts in which several candidates are elected by the same 
constituency.90 Proposals for major changes to electoral laws in the 
United States have historically been met with skepticism or outright 
hostility.91  
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 D.C. Denison, A Conversation with John Kenneth Galbraith, CAL. MONTHLY, Feb. 
1986, at 11.  
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 For example, Highton and Wolfinger estimate that if everyone had voted in the 1992 
presidential election, Bill Clinton would have gained an additional 2.5 percentage points in the 
popular vote. Benjamin Highton & Raymond E. Wolfinger, The Political Implications of Higher 
Turnout, 31 BRIT. J.POL. SCI. 179, 189 (2001). For estimates of increases of Democrats’ vote 
share if everyone voted in U.S. Senate elections, see Jack Citrin, Eric Schickler & John Sides, 
What if Everyone Voted? Simulating the Impact of Increased Turnout in Senate Elections, 47 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 75, 83 (2003) (estimating that Democrats’ vote share could increase by as 
much as 5 percentage points, and that the outcome of only four of ninety–one Senate races over 
a six–year period would have changed if everyone had voted). 
90
 GARY COX, MAKING VOTES COUNT: STRATEGIC COORDINATION IN THE WORLD’S 
ELECTORAL SYSTEMS 40–68 (1997) (discussing different types of electoral systems around the 
world). 
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 In one fairly high profile example, Lani Guinier, Bill Clinton’s nominee for Assistant 
Attorney General for Civil Rights faced considerable criticism for her advocacy of electoral 
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Carter, Foreword to LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL 
FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY vii–xx (1994). 
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Short of encouraging a multi-party system, there may be ways to 
make relatively non-convertible groups like African Americans more 
convertible. One recent study finds that African Americans’ policy 
preferences have become less liberal and more moderate over time, 
perhaps making African Americans more open to the GOP.92 From 
time to time, Republicans have made overtures to African American 
voters, sometimes explicitly arguing that Democrats have ignored 
African American interests. For example, George W. Bush challenged 
the Urban League, asking: 
Does the Democrat [sic] party take African American voters 
for granted? It’s a fair question. I know plenty of politicians 
assume they have your vote. But do they earn it and do they 
deserve it? Is it a good thing for the African American 
community to be represented mainly by one political party? 
That’s a legitimate question. How is it possible to gain 
political leverage if the party is never forced to compete? 
Have the traditional solutions of the Democrat [sic] party 
truly served the African American community?”93  
Although it is possible that the Republican Party could appeal to 
African Americans, at this point it remains hard to imagine a major 
effort on the Republicans’ part or an overwhelming response by 
African American voters.  
In summary, we have shown that candidates running for re-
election have incentives to appeal to constituents with greater voting 
power more than those with less voting power because the former 
have a greater impact on the election’s outcome. Since voting power 
is distributed unequally across important groups in American politics, 
one consequence of candidates’ incentives is that some groups—
namely those with more voting power—tend to get more of what they 
want from government than others. The Baker Court’s sense that 
unequal voting power would lead to inequalities in political 
representation appears to be accurate. Moreover, some groups of 
voters (again, those with more voting power) improve the 
attentiveness of elected officials to their concerns by voting, while 
those who possess less voting power appear to gain little or nothing 
by voting. We have reviewed a variety of potential reforms that could 
move the distribution of voting power toward equality. Each of the 
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Remarks by the President to the 2004 National Urban League Conference, (July 23, 2004, 10:35 
AM), http://georgewbush–whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/07/20040723-8.html.  
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reforms appears unlikely to be implemented any time soon. 
Consequently, it appears to us most likely that the inequalities in 
voting power we observe today will persist despite the legal equality 
of votes established in Baker.  
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